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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

24 March 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-61: CONSEQUENCES OF THE  
LOSS OF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT TO COMMUNIST CONTROL  
(Revised draft for Board consideration)

SCOPE

In an attempt to keep the number of assumptions to a minimum, the major emphasis in this estimate should be on an assessment of the strategic importance of the Indian subcontinent. Assumptions should be limited to: (a) a Communist regime has come to power in the subcontinent and is cooperating with the USSR and Communist China; (b) the Communists have not come to power in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. No attempt should be made to estimate either the likelihood of a Communist assumption of power or the effects of the various circumstances under which a Communist regime might conceivably come to power.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT WOULD THE WEST LOSE IF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL?

A. Military

1. What is the present strength and combat effectiveness of the ground, air and naval forces of the subcontinent?
2. To what extent does this military strength serve as a deterrent to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia? the Middle East?
3. In time of war, to what extent would subcontinent military forces be capable of resisting Communist aggression from Southeast Asia? from the Middle East?
4. In what ways and to what extent might a non-Communist, subcontinent be of military value to the West in a global conflict with the USSR?

- B. Economic (Contributions to NIE-56 : Likelihood of Loss of Important Economic Resources in Selected Foreign Areas, should be adequate to determine what resources the West is currently obtaining from the subcontinent, the consequences to the West of being denied these resources in time of peace or war, and those factors (short of Communist

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control) which might affect the ability of the US and its allies to exploit the resources of the subcontinent.)

C. Political

1. What political, ideological or psychological advantages and disadvantages accrue to the US from the present position of the countries of the subcontinent in the East-West conflict?

II. WHAT WOULD THE SOVIET BLOC GAIN IF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL?

A. Military

1. What positive contribution (as distinguished from the advantages of denial to the West in Section I-A, page 2) could a Communist subcontinent make to overall Soviet bloc military capabilities?
  - a. Under Communist control, to what extent would present subcontinent military forces contribute to Soviet bloc capabilities for:
    - i. Offensive operations against the Middle East and the Far East?
    - ii. Interfering with Western communications <sup>?</sup>  
~~in the Middle East and the Far East?~~
    - iii. Defending the Far East and the Middle East if those areas were all under Communist control?

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- b. To what extent could these capabilities be increased without material assistance from the Soviet bloc?
- c. To what extent could the Soviet bloc increase these capabilities? Consideration should be given to such factors as:
  - i. Probable Soviet policy with regard to building a strong military power on the subcontinent.
  - ii. Present Soviet commitments.
  - iii. Availability in the Soviet bloc of the necessary technical and material assistance.
  - iv. Problems of transportation and communications.

B. Economic

- 1. To what extent might the existing economic resources of the subcontinent increase the economic war potential of the Soviet bloc?
- 2. Under Communist control, to what extent might the potential economic resources of the subcontinent be developed? Consideration should be given to such factors as:
  - a. Present Soviet commitments and possible Soviet reluctance to create a strong Communist state the USSR might be unable to control.

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- b. A possible curtailment or cessation of trade with the West.
- c. Limitations on the ability of the Soviet bloc to supply the necessary economic and technical assistance.

C. Political

- 1. In terms of the East-West conflict, what political, ideological or psychological advantages or disadvantages might accrue to the Soviet bloc, as a consequence of Communist control of the subcontinent, in:
  - a. The Middle East?
  - b. Southeast Asia?
  - c. The non-Communist Far East?
  - d. Western Europe?

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